Is this 'Dark Versailles?'

Like the perception of a colour is changed by the background it is viewed against, the perception of a treaty can be changed by the treaty context in which it is viewed. As I am reading The Economic Consequences of the Peace by John Maynard Keynes at the moment, that is my most immediate reference for considering the recently proposed twenty-eight point plan for ending the war in Ukraine.

The first thing that strikes me about the plan is the number of points—twenty-eight, which is precisely twice the number in President Wilson's Fourteen Points that guided the Versailles treaty. Clemenceau famously quipped of Wilson's principles: "God gave us the Ten Commandments and we broke them. Wilson gives us the Fourteen Points. We shall see."

The other thing that strikes me is the boldness of a plan to achieve in the headline agreement what the Paris Conference achieved through what Keynes called "the subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen"—a Carthaginian Peace instead of one that respected both the letter and the spirit of the Fourteen Points.

The Treaty of Versailles held Germany as the sole state responsible for the war, setting the seed for future conflict. Keynes warned that such punitive terms would prove economically unworkable and politically destabilising. His book proposed alternatives—revision of reparations, cancellation of inter-Allied debts, international loans for reconstruction—reflecting principles of cooperation that would later inform post-World War II institutions.

Clear in the Twenty-Eight Points is a desire to undo these very principles and restore a world where the mighty can do as they will while the rest suffer as they must; where the aggressor is rewarded and victim punished.

It is a document in which the whole world has a stake. Its agreement would deny Article 2(4) of the UN Charter—the prohibition on acquiring territory by force—and the obligations under the Rome Statute to bring war crimes suspects before the International Criminal Court.

Of course, in the end it may be just another round of distraction and a waste of time and attention, as it is clear that the aggressor will not stop and capitulation is unconscionable.

While sacrifices would need to be made to achieve a ceasefire, and a frozen conflict secured by guarantees may be the best possible immediate goal, it is one that appears unacceptable to the aggressor.

Thus, it seems that this proposal cannot stand, either as it is for one side (and the world) or as modified for the aggressor. The one with "no cards," then, is the proposer if they believe they can coerce either party by talk to agree. Until Russia sings a different hymn, the only response can be one of war, whether by trade or kinetic.